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ABSTRACT
The Nigerian criminal jurisprudence prohibits abortion in all instances
except when necessary to save the life of a woman. This has driven many
women and girls seeking abortions to non-physician providers. These non-
physician procedures turn out to be unhygienic and unsafe. Nigerian abortion
statistics reveal an unacceptable high rate of maternal mortality and morbidity.
This analysis undertakes a close contextual examination of the exceptions to
outright prohibition, pointing out that the couching of some of the words make
the attainment of the legislative aim a mirage or at least illusory. The analysis
equally points out the heuristic discretionary potentials of some of the clauses,
which the Nigerian medical community could creatively utilize to a woman's
advantage. This paper calls for fundamental rethinking of the abortion life-
saving provisions. Fortunately, towards the completion of writing of this paper,
a bill was introduced in the Nigerian National Assembly which has the
concomitant potential of amending the present abortion laws. The balance of
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this interplay is reflected in a postscript. The general thrust of this paper is to
generate the momentum that will lead to a liberalizing amendment to the present
over-restrictive abortion regime in Nigeria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nigerian criminal jurisprudence prohibits abortion in all instances except
when necessary to save the life of a woman. Although there is no specific body
of laws known as "the Abortion Act" in Nigeria, the prohibitions and their
accompanying strict exceptions are embodied in the provisions of both the
Criminal and Penal Codes of Nigeria. This restrictive statutory formula has
driven many pregnant women and girls to non-physician providers in a bid to
avoid reluctant parenthood by accessing secretly illegal and septic abortions.
These procedures turn out to be unhygienic and unsafe. Moreover, abortions by
some physician providers equally result in risks to users. This medical
negligence is underpinned by the restrictive laws as well because the
inefficiency of physician providers appears to be strengthened by the ignorance
or general apathy of women seeking abortion. The effect is that most of these
women and girls pay the price either through their lives or complications to their
health. Abortion statistics in Nigeria reveal an unacceptable high rate of
maternal mortality and morbidity, with unsafe abortion constituting the highest
percentage within the myriad of contributory factors.
This analysis undertakes a close contextual examination of the exceptions,
pointing out that the couching of some of the words and clauses in the excep-
tions make the attainment of the legislative aim a mirage or at least illusory.
Some of the exceptions end up confounding and complicating the problems of
pregnant women and girls rather than providing a veritable haven for them.
Those confounding parts of the exceptions are so sweepingly drawn that they
appear to empower non-physician providers to procure abortion. Moreover, the
framing of the exceptions makes it difficult for medical practitioners to figure
out when to legally render abortion services in line with the legislative aim. The
analysis recognizing this quagmire points out the heuristic discretionary
potentials of some of the clauses, which the Nigerian medical community could
creatively utilize to the advantage of women.
On the whole, this paper calls for a fundamental rethinking of the abortion
life-saving provisions and concludes by calling for an amendment of some of
the exception clauses in order to incorporate the requisite life-saving devices in
line with the proper legislative aim of the drafters. The effects of these
restrictions on the reproductive and sexual health of Nigerian women once led
the Nigerian Society of Gynecology and Obstetrics to sponsor a Bill in the
Nigerian National Assembly called the Termination of Pregnancy Bill of 1981.
This Bill sought to legalize abortion where two registered doctors were
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convinced that the life of the pregnant woman was endangered, and where there
was a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental
handicap.' Although public opinion was in favor of the Bill, not surprisingly,
two small but powerful pressure groups, one of which was composed of conser-
vative women, vehemently opposed it. Ironically, that Bill was sponsored by
the Nigerian medical community due to "the increasing number of illegal
abortions carried out under inadequate health conditions which lead to high
death rates among [women and girls].' '2 The reaction of the women can easily
be explained. Nigerian women have always been subservient to their male
counterparts as a result of the paternalistic and androcentric bias that pervades
the entire sub-Saharan African society.
Fortunately, another opportunity has come in 2004. Towards the comple-
tion of the writing of this paper, Senator Stella Omu sponsored a bill in the
Nigerian National Assembly. The bill entitled "Maternal and Child Welfare,
Health Services (Procedure, etc) Bill [of] 2004" seeks a holistic reform of
Nigerian reproductive health care system. The provisions of the nine-section
bill are so embracing that it is not within the scope of this analysis to engage all
the sections. Of particular relevance to this paper are sections 5 and 6 which
impact abortion. The proposed bill, if passed, will provide the legal framework
for overhauling the present Nigerian abortion regime; it will concomitantly
repeal the present abortion laws as contained in the Criminal and Penal Codes.3
In response to this recent development, this analysis includes a postscript, which
charts the potentials of the proposed bill against the backdrop of a changing
legal climate. The balance of the complex interplay of the present abortion laws
and the proposed bill is dealt with accordingly.
The general thrust of this paper is to generate momentum that will lead to
a liberalizing amendment to the present over-restrictive abortion regime in
Nigeria. Structurally, the paper is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the
topic, lays down a compendium of abortion statistics in Nigeria, delineates the
statutory framework and gives an overview of the origin of dual criminal
jurisdiction in Nigeria. Part II undertakes a close contextual analysis of the
necessity test and carefully engages all the threshold matters that make up the
test. In this regard, the paper compares the present Nigerian abortion regime
with those of other advanced commonwealth jurisdictions, namely Britain and
Canada. Part III seeks to appraise the extent to which the proposed bill is a
1. For a detailed review of the Bill, see I.E. Adi, The Question of Abortion, July 1982 NIG.
CURRENT L. REV. 191.
2. See REBECCA J. COOK & BERNARD M. DICKENS, EMERGING ISSUES IN COMMONWEALTH
ABORTION LAWS (1983).
3. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRIM.] ch. 21, § 228-30, 297 (1990) (Federation of Nig.); PENAL CODE
[PENAL C.] § 232-35 (1983) (N. Nig.).
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departure from its hopeful predecessor - the present abortion laws in Nigeria.
Finally, Part IV embodies recommendations and conclusion.
A. Abortion Statistics in Nigeria
Unsafe abortion is one of the most serious problems facing thousands of
Nigerian women and girls. As it turns out, non-physician abortion procedures
lead to greater percentage of complications and death for women. The first
survey of physician abortion providers' in Nigeria in 1998 reveals that each
year, Nigerian women and girls obtain approximately 610,000 abortions, which
is at the rate of twenty-five abortions in every one-thousand women and girls
between the reproductive ages of fifteen to forty-four; it also reveals that only
an estimate of 40 percent of these abortions are performed by physicians in
established health facilities while the remaining 60 percent are performed by
non-physician providers. In other words, 366,000 abortions are performed by
non-physician providers annually.' Moreover, abortions by physician providers
equally result in complications.' The survey equally estimates that annually
183,000 women and girls experience complications from abortions by non-
physician providers, and do not receive treatment.7 The 1998 survey was not
significantly different from an earlier study carried out in 1996, which happens
to be "the first comprehensive population-based study of unwanted pregnancy
and induced abortion ever undertaken in any part of Nigeria. '' 8 This 1996 study
categorically reveals that as a result of the restrictive stance of the law, "women
frequently resort to clandestine abortion performed by unskilled practitioners,
leading to high rates of maternal mortality and morbidity. Of the 50,000
maternal deaths that are estimated to occur in Nigeria annually, nearly 20,000
4. See Stanley K. Henshaw et al., The Incidence of Induced Abortion in Nigeria, 24 INT'L FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 156, 162 (1998).
5. See Id. (observing that "this is the first time a national survey of physician abortion providers
has been conducted in a developing country where abortion is largely illegal").
6. Id. at 161-62. The survey points out the percentage of complications emanating from different
classes of non-physician providers and physician providers:
Respondents considered pharmacists or chemists as one of the two most common providers of
abortions resulting in complications (mentioned by 50% of respondents), followed by paramedics (40%),
nurses or midwives (35%) and other doctors (22%).... "Quacks"--individuals with no formal training who
nonetheless provide medical treatment-were mentioned by 23% of respondents.
Id. The survey also noted that, "[a]ccording to a recent household survey of more than 3,700 women
in Edo and Lagos, 8.8% of women who had had an abortion performed by a doctor had experienced
complications that were treated in a private or government clinic." Id. at 159-60.
7. Id. at 159. The survey asserted that, "half of all women who have nonphysician abortions [that
is 183,000] experience complications requiring treatment by a physician." See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 160.
8. FRIDAY E. OKONOFUA ET AL., CRITIcAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: WOMEN'S
EXPERIENCES OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY AND INDUCED ABORTION IN NIGERIA 20 (1996).
are attributable to complications of unsafe abortion."9 The study also reveals
that most abortions carried out by private doctors operating in private medical
clinics had attendant high rates of complications.'0 It is estimated that in
Nigeria, 1000 maternal deaths occur in every 100,000 live births, while in West
Africa, the World Health Organization estimates that 12,000 deaths occur
annually due to unsafe abortion."
There is growing concern over teenage pregnancies in Nigeria and other
African countries. Nearly two-thirds of cases of septic abortions come from
girls between the ages of fifteen to nineteen. 12 Notwithstanding this shocking
discovery, domestic African governments and their legal systems are still
reluctant to squarely address the abortion quandary. It has been observed that,
"the risk of maternal death for African women is 1 in 20 compared to 1 in
10,000 in developed countries. ' ' 13 What a shocking vacuum between two seem-
ingly intertwined worlds. It is evident that the wide vacuum in maternal death
rate between the developed and the developing world demonstrates that a large
proportion of these unexpected and premature deaths arising from unsafe
abortion are preventable.' 4
The above analysis reveals that the high rate of maternal mortality and
morbidity in Nigeria is mainly as a result of women's recourse to non-physician
providers, which in turn is due to the unduly restrictive abortion regime in
Nigeria. Moreover, notwithstanding that non-physician providers perform more
abortions in Nigeria than physicians, which leads to a high rate of complica-
tions, abortions by some private physician providers are equally shrouded with
complications. Invariably, no matter the angle from which one views maternal
mortality and morbidity in Nigeria, the law is always implicated. Complications
resulting from physician providers translate to some degree of inefficiency on
the part of medical practitioners in Nigeria. This inefficiency is underpinned by
the restrictive stance of abortion laws. It is submitted that a liberalized abortion
climate will make medical practitioners more responsible in the delivery of
abortion services for four main reasons:
9. Id. atl.
10. Id. at 25.
11. See UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 154-155 (1996);
See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF INCIDENCE OF
A MORTALITY DUE TO UNSAFE ABORTION WITH A LISTING OF AVAILABLE COUNTRY DATA (3d ed. 1998),
www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/MSM_97_16/MSM9716abstract.en.html.
12. See W.M. Kabira, et al., The Effect of Women's Role on Health: The Paradox, 58 INT'L. J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 23, 26 (1997).
13. Id.
14. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION 13 (1995).
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1) Reporting of the number of abortions performed will be improved and
the government would have better records for statistical purposes.
However, it should be cautioned that the names and personal details
of users need not be included in the reports since the record is only
needed for statistical purposes. This will help preserve the
confidential information of abortion-seekers;
1 5
2) Victims of medical negligence will be more willing to pursue their
tort claims against erring practitioners;
3) The regulatory body of medical practice in Nigeria will be alert to
discipline its members for breach of expected standard of practice;
4) The Nigerian Medical Council may be more willing to organize
continuous medical education aimed at retraining its members on the
use of current and safer procedures for the management of abortion
and post-abortion complications.'6
From an economic perspective, the reasons for the preference of non-
physician providers might not be far fetched. The basic truth is that most of the
women and girls seeking and accessing abortion are poor and lack the
professional fees that physician providers require.17 Besides, even when the
financial constraint is removed, societal moral and religious predilections to
abortion create substantial hindrance to the achievement of a safe reproductive
community for women and girls. Almost all women and girls seeking and
accessing abortion in Nigeria prefer having abortion in secret because of the
15. See OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 17. (stating that the 1996 study observes: "that a high
proportion of the women [interviewed] mentioned the lack of confidentiality attendant with the use of doctors
as an additional deterrent to the use of qualified doctors for the procurement of abortion."); See also M.K.
Jinadu, et al., Traditional Fertility Regulation Among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria I AFR. J. REPROD.
HEALTH 56, 61 (1997) (describing a study conducted in 1990 among Nigerian Yoruba women and traditional
healers, which aimed at identifying and describing the practice, preparation, and administration of traditional
contraceptives, that observed the following: "When [the women were] asked why they preferred the use of
traditional contraceptive methods to orthodox methods, approximately 85 percent of respondents mentioned
the easy accessibility of the TMPs [traditional medical practitioners] and the assurance of privacy during
consultation") (alteration not in original).
16. The 1996 study indicates that the most frequently used abortion procedure in Nigeria was
dilation and curettage (D & C) whereas the most current, safest and effective method of pregnancy termination
worldwide-manual vacuum aspiration (MVA)-was never mentioned. OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 18.
Moreover, RU was also not used. Id.
17. The 1996 study indicates that although most abortion costs are paid by the partners of the
women (husbands or boyfriends), some women pay for the abortions themselves. Id. at 14. The study went
on to observe that women "most frequently mentioned the high fees charged by doctors as the major deterrent
to the use of doctors." Id. at 17. It is submitted that abortion dilemmas are mainly suffered by poor women
in Nigeria because most rich women are financially capable of circumventing the restrictive domestic regime
by traveling to foreign countries to access safe legal abortion. See id.
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religious, cultural, and moral prejudices associated with it." Additional health
consequences that result from unsafe abortion are infertility, chronic disability,
transfusion-related infections, and lack of emergency care for complications. 9
B. Exemption Clauses
The full-prohibitive sections are sections 228,229, and 230 of the Criminal
Code,2" and sections 233 and 234 of the Penal Code.2' Abortion is totally
prohibited under these sections, except when it is necessary to save the life of
the mother. The relevant sections embodying the necessity test are section 297
of the Criminal Code and sections 232 and 235 of the Penal Code:
Section 297 of the Criminal Code:
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith
and with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any
person for his benefit, or upon an unborn child for the preservation of
the mother's life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable,
having regard to the patient's state at the time and to all the
circumstances of the case.22
Section 232 of the Penal Code:
WHOEVER VOLUNTARILY CAUSES A WOMAN WITH CHILD TO
MISCARRY shall, if such miscarriage be not caused IN GOOD FAITH FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SAVING THE LIFE OF THE WOMAN, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with
fine or with both (emphasis added).23
Section 235 of the Penal Code:
WHOEVER before the birth of any child DOES ANY ACT WITH THE
INTENTION of thereby preventing that child from being born alive or
causing it to die after its birth and DOES BY SUCH ACT prevent that
child from being born alive or causes it to die after its birth, shall, IF
18. According to a 1990 study conducted in Nigeria, women preferred traditional contraceptive
methods to orthodox methods because of the easy accessibility of the traditional medical practitioners and the
assurance of privacy during consultation. Jinadu, supra note 15.
19. See COMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION, supra note 14, at 15; See also Henshaw, supra note 4, at 14-
15.
20. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRiM.] ch. 21, § 228-30 (1990) (Federation of Nig.).
21. PENAL CODE [PENAL C.] § 233-34 (1963) (N. Nig.)
22. C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297.
23. PENAL C. § 232.
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SUCH ACT BE NOT CAUSED IN GOOD FAITH FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SAVING THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to fourteen years or with fine or with both
(emphasis added).24
These exceptions constituting the necessity test cover voluntary abortion and not
involuntary abortion that may occur as a consequence of prescriptions or
administration of medical procedures. Of course, if abortion occurs through
involuntary conduct, the mental element of the crime, intent, which is core to
most offenses, will be lacking. As such no offense will arise. The only excep-
tion to this intent requirement is in rare instances of strict liability offenses,
which do not require proof of mental elements.25
C. Origin of Dual Criminal Jurisdiction in Nigeria
All the sections of the Nigerian Criminal Code impacting abortion, in line
with the abortion laws of most African commonwealth jurisdictions, are
substantially adopted from the Offences Against the Person Act (Britain) of
1861,26 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act (Britain) of 1929,27 but do not
include the changes achieved in R v. Bourne28 and the subsequent Abortion Act
(Britain) of 1967, as amended, which reformed the 1861 Act. 29 These sections
form part of the 'received' English law.30 On the other hand, the Penal Code,
which operates in the Northern states of Nigeria only, is drawn from both the
24. § 235.
25. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an exhaustive exploration of strict responsibility.
For a comprehensive analysis of strict responsibility regime in the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, see Victor
N. Opara, An Appraisal of the Doctrine of Strict Responsibility under the Criminal Code, 5 JURIST 33 (1996).
26. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24-25 Vict., c. 100, § 1 (Eng).
27. Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, §1(1) (Eng.).
28. The King v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687 (Eng. C.C.A. 1939).
29. See Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1 (1967) (Eng.). The Act does not apply to Northern Ireland.
On a more general note, the Nigerian Criminal Code was substantially based on the Queensland Criminal
Code of Australia which itself was based on a code drafted by Sir James Fitzpatrick in 1879 and aimed at
replacing the common law of crime in England, although the code was rejected by the British Parliament for
whom it was initially drafted. See generally James S. Read, Criminal Law in the Africa of Today and
Tomorrow, 7 J. AFR. L. 5 (1963).
30. The introduction of the main body of English law in Nigeria dates back to 1863 when the British
colonial authorities enacted Ordinance No. 3 of 1863 following the creation of the Colony of Lagos in 1862.
See generally A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAw 1-12 (1963). More than a century and four
decades after, the sources of law which the British colonial authorities established for the Colony of Lagos
has remained a standard for the whole of Nigeria without many substantial changes. Id. Historically Nigerian
law is derived from three sources, which are: (a) English Law-this comprises the general law of England
which was introduced into or received by Nigeria; (b) Nigerian domestic legislation and case law; and (c)
Nigerian customary law. Id. For a detailed historical analysis of the Nigerian legal system see id.
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Indian Penal Code and the Scottish laws which are based upon the customary
or common law of Scotland.31 The enforcement of two codes with criminal
liability content under one jurisdiction might appear strange to some legal
systems since criminal laws are to a greater extent regulated by federal or
central legislatures.
In 1954 there was a major regulatory shift in the Nigerian legal system.
Prior to 1954 Nigeria had a unified system of law, and there was only one
legislature for the entire country. Steps to decentralize the unified legislative
body started in 1952 with the establishment of regional legislatures. In 1954 a
full-fledged federal system of government with tripartite legislative
jurisdictional lists was born in Nigeria. As a result, Nigeria was divided initially
into three regions and a federal territory. The Northern region appointed a panel
of jurists in 1958 to act as an advisory body to its government. The main task
of the panel was to advise the Regional government on the application of both
Moslem and non-Moslem laws. 2 The panel came up with the recommendation
that a Penal Code Law and a Criminal Procedure Code Law be enacted and
made applicable throughout the Region and that these laws should replace the
Nigerian Criminal Code Ordinance33 and the Nigerian Criminal Procedure
Ordinance34 both of which were, prior to the panel's recommendations,
applicable throughout Nigeria. The adoption of the recommendations by the
Regional government led to the enactment of the Penal Code in 1963." 5
II. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY TEST
The issues raised by the exception clauses will be discussed in the course
of this analysis. Some recurrent thresholds are that performance of the abortion
be done "in good faith" through "surgical operation" with "reasonable care and
skill" by "a person/whoever" and for the purpose of "preserving the mother's
31. The Penal Code is substantially a replication of the Penal Code of Sudan, which in turn was
drawn from the Indian Penal Code drafted by Lord Macaulay in 1834. See generally ALAN GLEDHILL, THE
PENAL CODES OF NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE SUDAN (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1963). Lord Macaulay
had used the common law of England and Scotland as the corner stones of his draft.
32. In the defunct Northern Region and the present Northern states of Nigeria, the major substantive
law that the courts administer is the Moslem Law of the Maliki School. See ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF
MUHAMMADAN LAW 18-20 (3 ed., 1964).
33. Nigerian Laws, 1948, c. 42 (In 1958 this Ordinance became known as the Criminal Code); CODE
CRIMINAL ch. 42, § 228-30 (Federation of Nig.).
34. Nigerian Laws, 1948, c. 43. In the same vein in 1958, this Ordinance became known as the
Criminal Procedure Act. See Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1990, c. 43 (Criminal Procedure
Act).
35. See PENAL CODE [PENAL C.] (1963) (N. Nig.).
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life" or "saving the life of the woman."36 These thresholds constitute core parts
of the necessity test.
A. Reasonable Care and Skill
One of the thresholds in section 297 of the Criminal Code is that the
abortion provider must exercise "reasonable care and skill." Moreover, the
performance of the abortion is required to be "reasonable" when viewed from
"the patient's state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case." These
thresholds indicate that the context under which an abortion is performed
invariably matters a lot, and that there are many areas of uncertainty that appear
to be left to the discretion of the abortion provider. Section 297 is substantially
adopted from subsection 1 (1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act (Britain) of
1929. 37 However, that subsection does not contain the "reasonable care and
skill," "reasonable performance," and "circumstantial" evidence requirements
of section 297, all of which appear to have been imported from the decision of
R. v. Bourne.35 With respect to the reasonable performance requirement, every
performance does not necessarily render abortion unreasonable. Where the
performance is illegal,39 then even objectively reasonable good faith cannot
transform such an illegal abortion into a reasonable one. Such abortion-without-
consent will amount to criminal battery. In that case, if the woman dies, the
physician will be liable, since death will be as a result of intended abortion. The
man equally may be punished as a criminal conspirator" or principal offender."
36. See CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRIM.] ch. 21, § 228-30 (1990) (Federation of Nig.).
37. See Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(1) (Eng.).
38. See Bourne, 1 K-B. at 690 & 694. ("A MAN OF THE HIGHEST SKILL, ... performs the operation
... ON REASONABLE GROUNDS AND WITH ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE, ... the jury are quite entitled to take the view
that the doctor who, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THAT HONEST BELIEF, operates, is operating for
the purpose of preserving the life of the mother") (emphasis added).
39. For example, this may occur where an abortion is intentionally performed on a woman without
her consent for the convenience of her husband or boyfriend and the physician. The man could instruct the
physician to cause his girlfriend to miscarry, probably because he is already married and does not want to
obstruct the harmony in his home or does not desire a polygamous marriage. This scenario was played out
in State v. Ade-Ojo, 12 CC.H.C.J. 27 (1972), where a man hired two medical practitioners to perform an
abortion on his girlfriend. The man was charged and convicted, but the practitioners were not charged since
they acted as prosecution witnesses. Id However, the fact that the practitioners were neither charged nor
convicted does not mean that their conduct was legally permissible. Id. Their escape route was simply a
question of legal technicality: the State needed independent evidence to prove its case which largely depended
on the evidence of the man or the practitioners. Id. The Court frowned at the conduct of the practitioners and
the presiding Judge expressed his disgust in Page 31 of his judgment by promising to send a copy of the
judgment to the Attorney General and the Nigerian Medical Council for appropriate disciplinary actions
against the practitioners. Id. Although the statutory reasonable-performance threshold was not under review
in this case, it appears the facts of the case fit nicely to the circumstances contemplated by this threshold.
40. See PENAL C. §§ 96 & 97, section 96 of which provides the following: "(1) When two or more
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Moreover, as the Criminal Code does not define "skill," one is to conjecture
whether nurses, midwives and, paramedics are repositories of contemplated
abortion skill.
B. Surgical Operation
Abortion by purely medical procedures such as the administration of drugs
will appear not to be accommodated within the Criminal Code exemption. This
is because in medical parlance, surgery and medicine are considered to be some-
what different notwithstanding that they may appear inextricably intertwined in
some material particular. The words "surgeon," "surgery," and "medicine" have
been defined respectively as:
[surgeon is] one who applies the principles of the healing art to
external diseases or injuries, or to internal injuries or malformations,
requiring manual or instrumental intervention. [In other words, he is]
[olne who practices surgery.... The term surgery, comes from two
Greek words signifying the hand and work, meaning a manual
procedure by means of instruments.... The practice of medicine, in
contradistinction to the practice of surgery, denotes the treatment of
disease by the administration of drugs or other sanative substances.42
In R. v. Edgal,43 the now defunct West African Court of Appeal was of the
opinion that section 297 of the Criminal Code applied to surgical operations
only. This surgical operation requirement indicates that this threshold adds to
the risk of abortion users in Nigeria by unnecessarily exposing them to greater
danger. Surgery is a complicated procedure and Nigerian health facilities may
not boast of modem sophisticated surgical instruments and equipment which
would guarantee safety to a higher degree, unlike their counterparts in
persons agree to do or cause to be done--(a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means,
such an agreement is called a criminal conspiracy." Section 97 outlines the punishment for criminal
conspiracy. § 97.
41. C. CRiM. ch. 2, § 7. The man may equally be punished under the Criminal Code as a principal
offender. Id. Section 7 of the Criminal Code provides the following:
When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken
part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with
actually committing it, that is to say:--(a) every person who actually does the act or
makes the omission which constitutes the offence; (c) every person who aids another
person in committing the offence; (d) any person who counsels or procures any other
person to commit the offence.
Id.
42. Bouviers's Law Dictionary 3209 (8th ed. 1984).
43. R. v. Edgal, 3 W.A.C.A. 133 (W. Afr. Ct. App. 1938).
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developed countries that are technologically current. If the same result could
be achieved through a purely medical procedure, like administration of drugs,
why limit the woman's choice to surgery?
The health implications of this limitation would be highly appreciated
when viewed from the alarming increase in the spread of HIV infection
especially, in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular." There are cases
where patients have contracted HIV infections through their surgeons.45
Surgeons equally stand the risk of infecting or being infected with HIV from
their patients. They are constantly exposed to patients' blood, and when their
equipment or surgical instruments are not adequately sterilized, their facilities
may be a disguised infection-transmitting channel. Improperly sterilized
surgical instruments are basic means of spreading HIV infections to women and
girls receiving abortions. Moreover, as a result of the possibility of hemorrhage
during surgical operations, women and girls accessing abortion stand the risk
of contracting HIV through transfusion of contaminated blood. 6 While it is
acknowledged that surgeons owe a professional duty of care and skill to
patients, abortion users may not have the moral support to bring up claims due
to societal predilections towards abortion.47 Moreover, even where such claims
are sought, prosecutions on grounds of failure to provide such duties are rare in
Nigeria.4" Although the risk of patients' exposure to surgeons' HIV-infected
44. According to the Federal Ministry of Health, reproductive health in Nigeria is highly
deteriorating. Draft of the National Reproductive Health Policy and Strategy 9-10 (Federal Ministry of Health
2000). One major national indicator of this is "the continual increase of HIV sero-positivity rate among
antenatal clinic clients from 1.4% in 1991/92 to 4.5% in 1995/96 and 5.4% in 1999." Id. The Ministry further
observed that "there are at least 2.7 million sexually active Nigerians infected with the AIDS virus. Eighty per
cent of HIV infections in Nigeria are contracted through sexual intercourse. Other causes of [HIV] infection
are through unsterile injections and the inadvertent transfusion of unsafe blood and body piercing,
scarification or cutting." Id. (emphasis added).
45. On risks associated with surgery, see Van Mol et al v. Ashmore, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637
(Can.). On the implications of HIV infection for women, see generally Karen.H. Rothenberg & Stephen J.
Paskey, The Risk ofDomestic Violence and Women with HIVlnfection: Implications for Partner Notification,
Public Policy, and the Law, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1569-74 (1995).
46. See Draft of the National Reproduction Health Policy, supra note 44.
47. Stigmatization can foster a climate of abandonment of one's rights. It may also mean that a
woman who has a claim may not pursue it for fear of being labeled. A great deal of discrimination faced by
abortion users is underpinned by social construct of morality and "normality."
48. To my knowledge, among the scant abortion cases in Nigeria, only two reported cases involved
the prosecution of medical practitioners. Comm'r of Police v. Modebe, 1980 (1) NCR 367; State v. Johnson
Oke, 9 C.C.H.C.J. 1305 (1975). Not surprisingly, the defendants were acquitted in both cases. See Isabella
Okagbue, Pregnancy Termination and the Law in Nigeria, Vol. 21 No.4 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 197, 199 (1990)
(observing that "[b]oth public prosecutors and the courts have traditionally been reluctant to prosecute and
convict members of the medical profession for acts performed as part of their professional functions. With
regard to abortions, in particular, the issue is compounded....").
body is so low that some commentators regard it as non-existent, 49 it has been
correctly observed that:
Surgeons or dentists may cut themselves through their protective
gloves particularly in undertaking procedures in which they do not
have sight of their hands, and they may then bleed into patients'
bodies before it is surgically or otherwise appropriate for them to
remove their hands.50
This observation is in line with current realities. Therefore, the exemption
clause in the Criminal Code is a flagrant exposure of abortion users in Nigeria
to greater risks of HIV infection to the extent that it permits abortion to save the
woman's life only when it is performed through surgical operation. Com-
paratively, the Penal Code exemption, which is silent in section 232 as to the
manner of achieving the life-saving objective and in section 235, which permits
the life-saving objective to be achieved by "any act" appears preferable.
C. Performance of the Act by a Person or Whoever
The Criminal Code and the Penal Code permit "a person" and "whoever"
respectively to carry out the necessary life-saving abortion. In other words,
provided abortion is carried out in good faith to save the life of the mother, it
appears the qualification of the person providing abortion is immaterial. These
words are so sweeping that non-physician providers appear empowered. To that
extent, the couching of the laws may be responsible for the high rate of maternal
mortality and morbidity in Nigeria resulting from non-physician abortions. It
must, however, be pointed out that in this regard, the Criminal Code exemption
seems better than that of the Penal Code in that it requires the exercise of
"reasonable care and skill" as seen above. But this comparison cannot be
stretched too far because although the Penal Code does not specifically use the
"reasonable care and skill" supplement, its definition of "good faith"51 accords
with the Criminal Code requirement of "reasonable care and skill." Deference
should be made for some non-physician providers such as nurses, midwives and
paramedics who may provide abortion services with reasonable care and skill
since they are professionally qualified health personnel and may have observed
49. See Susan L. DiMaggio, State Regulations and the HIV-Positive Health Care Professional: A
Response to a Problem that Does Not Exist, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 497-99 (1993).
50. See Bernard M. Dickens, Health Care Practitioners and HIV Rights, Duties and Liabilities in
HIV, LAW, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS-TExTs AND MATERIALS 66, 92 (D.C. Jayasuriya ed., 199H).
51. See the analysis on "good faith" infra section 1(E).
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physicians carry out such procedures. 2 However, the inability to manage
complications that may result occasionally is the more crucial point to note.
Due to the shortage of medical practitioners in most rural communities in
Nigeria and the high cost associated with accessing medical practitioners, which
most poor women and girls in Nigeria cannot afford, it is advisable that nurses,
midwives, and paramedics be permitted to perform abortion at early stages of
pregnancy. The international and African medical communities have endorsed
nurses, midwives, and paramedics in the providing of abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy, although with a requirement that they act under the super-
vision of a medical doctor who would intervene in case of potential emer-
gencies. 3 The necessity test raises a paradox in that while the "any person/
whoever" threshold permits any person to perform an abortion, another
threshold requires the use of reasonable care and skill, which has professional
underpinnings. While it could be argued that physicians, as well as nurses,
midwives, and paramedics, owe duty of care and skill to their patients, such
duty cannot be expected of laypersons. An herbalist who does not know the
medical composition of the herbs he administers to procure abortion cannot be
expected to owe duty of care and skill, nor will a hospital clerk. Such pro-
fessional duties are beyond laypersons. While such duties can be enforced
against professionals through license-withdrawal, it is difficult to enforce these
duties against people who have no license to protect.5 4 Accordingly, the law
52. It has been acknowledged that, "since some non-physician providers such as midwives, nurses
and paramedics have obtained medical training ...[they] should be able to perform abortions that do not result
in medical complications." See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 160.
53. On views of Africans see Fre' Le Poole-Griffiths, The Law ofAbortion in Ghana, 9 U. GHANA
L.J. 103, 123 (1972); Charles Ngwena, The History and Transformation of Abortion Law in South Africa,
30(3) ACTA ACAD. 32, 44-48 (1998) (observing that "[p]ermitting midwives to perform abortions in the first
trimester is a realistic way of meeting a dire need. Abortions during this trimester are safer and can be
performed medically without putting the patient unduly at risk."); On views of the international community
see Rebecca. J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, Abortion Laws in African Commonwealth Countries, 25 J. AFR.
L. 60,73 (1981) (citing JOHN M. PAXMAN, ET AL., THE USE OF PARAMEDIDALS FOR PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
IN THE COMMONWEALTH: A SURVEY OF MEDICAL-LEGAL ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (1979)); John
Guillebaud, Medical Termination of Pregnancy: Combined with Prostaglandin RU 486 is Effective, 30 BRIT.
MED. L.J. 352 (1990); Mary W. Rodger & David T. Baird, Introduction of Therapeutic Abortion in Early
Pregnancy with Mifeppristone in Combination with Prostaglandin, LANCET, Dec. 19, 1987.
54. It has been observed that
[tiraditional healers and, for instance, birth attendants significantly practice health care
in many areas. ... A legal distinction remains, however, between academically
qualified, professionally licensed health care practitioners such as physicians and
nurses, and practitioners who have received no training that complied with widely
recognized standards, who accept allegiance to no enforceable code of ethical practice,
and whom the law would not hold to higher standards of knowledge, proficiency and
care than are expected of a layperson. The legal rights, duties and liabilities of those
who deliver health care services differ, depending on their status and the expectations
should specifically mention the category of persons contemplated within the
necessity test as is the case with abortion laws of most commonwealth
jurisdictions. 55
D. Preserving/Saving the Woman's Life
This phrase appears to be central to the necessity test. An important issue
that arises from an analysis of this threshold is the contextual meaning of
"preservation of the mother's life" and "saving the life of the woman." These
sections do not provide any specific criteria that would serve as a barometer for
determining when abortion becomes necessary to save the life of the mother.
The inability of the law to lay down any tangible criteria for determining when
a pregnant woman's life deserves to be saved appears to be a welcome discre-
tionary tool. It gives wide discretion to a medical practitioner to address a
pregnant woman's circumstances based on his or her personal interpretation of
the situation. Moreover, the use of phrases such as "reasonable," "ground of
performance," "patient's state," and "all the circumstances of the case" reveal
that the determination of the life-saving/life-preserving context is essentially a
question of fact, and there is no absolute formula or bright line test. By per-
mitting the medical practitioner to act within his discretion, the fear of
inadequate evidence to prove reasonable grounds in the event of alleged illegal
inducement or criminal participation is removed, thereby making it possible for
medical practitioners to act when saving the life of the woman becomes
apparently necessary.
This appears to heighten the object and purpose of the legislature, which
is to create an exception to outright prohibition when saving the woman's life
becomes paramount. The English abortion precedent-setting case, R v.
Bourne,5 6 construed section 58 of the British Offenses Against the Person Act
of 1861, which is similar to the sections of the Nigerian Codes under review, as
impacting on a physician abortion provider. While considering the meaning of
the phrase "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" the court opined:
In cases where the doctor anticipates, basing his opinion upon the
existence of the profession, that the child cannot be delivered without
the death of the mother, it is obvious that the sooner the operation is
they reasonably create of the availability and calibre of the services they offer.
Dickens, supra note 50, at 67-68.
55. See e.g., Abortion Act 1967, ch. 87, s. 1 (Eng.) (specifically using the words "registered medical
practitioner(s)" to refer to the class of persons permitted to "terminate pregnancy"); CODE CRIMINAL ch. 46,
§ 287(1) (Can.) (Specifically using the words "a qualified medical practitioner... in an accredited or approved
hospital" to label the persons eligible to "procure miscarriage").
56. Bourne, I K.B. 687.
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performed the better. The law does not require the doctor to wait
until the unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death. In such
a case he is not only entitled, but it is his duty to perform the
operation with a view to saving her life ... I think those words ought
to be construed in a reasonable sense, and, if the doctor is of opinion,
on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the prob-
able consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make
the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to
take the view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving
the life of the mother.57
In other words, the threshold is not limited to danger to life, but covers danger
to therapeutic health as well. 58 A physician, who is of the opinion that a
woman's life or health is likely to be endangered by the continuation of
pregnancy, is protected by this phrase if he or she performs the abortion. The
opinion need not be based on full conviction, but rather any reasonable belief,
since the gathering of complete evidence might lead to the woman's death or
irreversible danger to her health. In other words, only primafacie evidence is
required if the object and purpose of the necessity test is to be achieved.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Morgentaler, it is a basic
tenet of the criminal justice system that when a legislature creates a defense to
a criminal charge, the defense should not be illusory or so difficult to attain that
it is practically impossible. 9 Accordingly, the discretion given to the Nigerian
medical community in this life-preserving threshold is a welcome development
that aims to achieve the desired legislative aim of the drafters. The West
African Court of Appeal in the Nigerian case of R. v. Edgal,6° where four people
were charged with unlawfully supplying drugs to procure an unlawful abortion,
applied the thrust of the Bourne decision. The Court, in adopting the Bourne
analysis, held that no abortion is unlawful when performed to save the life of the
woman.
6 1
57. Id. at 693-94.
58. Unfortunately, it appears Nigerian courts are keeping sealed lips on this creative aspect of the
Bourne decision. Even in Edgal, where the reasoning in Bourne was applied, the West African Court of
Appeal steered away from engaging in this issue. I W.A.C.A. 133. However, at least one legal scholar is
optimistic that although this aspect of Bourne remains to be judicially explored in Nigeria, it is likely that the
courts will adopt the entire reasoning in Bourne because English decisions are persuasive authorities in
Nigeria. See Okagbue, supra, note 48, at 198.
59. R. v. Morgentaler, 44 [1988] D.L.R. (14th) 385, 386 (Can.).
60. See Edgal, 4 W.A.C.A. 133.
61. Id.
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Another issue that arises under this life-preserving theme is the legitimacy
of the invocation of conscientious objection by medical personnel under the
circumstances of a life-threatening pregnancy. Although Nigerian criminal
jurisprudence does not make provisions for right of conscientious objection in
abortion matters, the Nigerian Constitution does provide for such right.62 More-
over, it has become part of the criminal justice system of most commonwealth
jurisdictions to include such rights in abortion laws.63 The exercise of right of
conscientious objection is limited, however; it is not available to a medical
practitioner when a treatment is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.6
Accordingly, the Nigerian medical community cannot validly invoke this right
as a mechanism for refusing to perform abortion when the life of a pregnant
woman is jeopardized. Apart from the fact that such a refusal will constitute an
element of criminal negligence under the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, it
would also go against medical ethics, which is founded on the saving of life.65
Besides, such a refusal to render life-saving abortion will serve no public
interest.
In addition, the life-preserving threshold plays an important role in deter-
mining the duties of medical practitioners when confronted with women
experiencing complications as a result of unsafe or incomplete abortion. It is
not uncommon to see instances where women who are experiencing complica-
tions are denied emergency care in hospitals as a result of either misinter-
pretation of the legal restrictions of abortion or the moral/religious inclination
of the medical practitioner. The bleak atmosphere is even more complicated
when a girl or unmarried woman is involved; most hospitals find it unreasonable
to provide such services. It has been argued that:
[C]omplications require emergency assessment and management.
These women need emergency care which must be provided even
62. See NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) ch. IV (Fundamental
Rights), § 38(1) ("Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion...").
63. See e.g., Termination of Pregnancy Act (Zambia) 1972 § 4; See also the Abortion Act, 1967,
§ 4 (Eng.).
64. This limitation of right to conscientious objection is embodied in abortion laws of most
commonwealth countries as follows: "Nothing shall affect any duty to participate in any treatment which is
necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant
woman." Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1972, § 4(2) (Zambia); see also The Adoption Act, 1967, §4(2)
(Eng.).
65. This argument is supported by the observation that "if a case arose where the life of the woman
could be saved by performing the operation and the doctor refused to perform it because of his religious
opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of being brought before this Court on a charge of
manslaughter by negligence." Bourne, 1 K.B. 687.
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where there are legal restrictions on induced abortion. Assessment of
the woman's condition and provision of services must be available on
a 24-hours-a-day basis from the point at which the woman first
contacts the health care system to the point at which she receives the
care she requires.'
It is against health doctrines for women presenting with complications emanat-
ing from unsafe or incomplete abortion to be denied emergency assessment and
treatment. As the medical profession is founded on the saving of lives, and as
the overarching legislative aim of creating the exceptions to outright prohibitive
abortion in Nigeria is to save the life of pregnant women who are prejudiced by
the continuation of pregnancy, the Nigerian medical community must live up
to its expected professional standards, and must, as a matter of necessity,
provide adequate medical treatment to victims of unsafe or incomplete abortion.
E. Good Faith
While the Criminal Code is silent on the meaning of "good faith," the
Penal Code in section 37 defines "good faith" as "nothing is said to be done or
believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and
attention.' ,17 In 1979, the Federal Court of Appeal in Dr. D.I. Pam Tok v. The
State had the opportunity of construing the Penal Code "good faith" threshold
as it applies to abortion providers in Nigeria.68 Dr. Tok, a medical practitioner,
was charged with causing the death of a woman in the process of procuring
abortion contrary to section 232 of the Penal Code. The prosecution argued that
Dr. Tok performed an operation and thereby caused a secondary school student
to miscarry a "three month" old child.69 Dr. Tok's defense was that he
performed the operation when the student had a partial miscarriage, was
bleeding, and the operation was necessary to save the life of the student.7"
There was evidence that the deceased had unsuccessfully attempted to procure
her own abortion before consulting the practitioner.7" Although the surgical
operation was performed in a hospital, several irregularities surrounded Dr.
Tok's conduct including non-registration of the patient in the hospital roster.72
Dr. Tok's defense of treating for an incomplete abortion was rejected by both
66. See Complications of Abortion, supra note 14.
67. See Penal Code [Penal C.] § 233-34 (1963) (Northern Nig.)
68. Pam Tok v. The State FCA/K/84/78 (unreported decision) (Federal Court of Appeal 1979)
(Nasir, Uwais & Ademola JJ.F.C.A).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
the trial and appellate Courts because his general conduct did not portray "good
faith."73 Moreover, The Federal Court of Appeal held that the onus was on the
appellant practitioner to show that he acted in good faith for the purpose of
saving the life of the patient.74 He was accordingly convicted under section 232
of the Penal Code.
The combined effect of a purposive statutory interpretation and judicial
construction of good faith appears to be very clear; it restricts the procurement
of a life-saving abortion to any person who can prove that they exercised due
care and attention during delivery of the medical services. This is a question of
fact to be proved by the amount of evidence gathered by the abortion provider
and their general conduct during delivery of the services. While the legislative
aim of the drafters may have been well intended, the omnibus word "whoever,"
as analyzed in section C of this paper, renders the legislative intention a mere
formality. In other words, the diligence requirement is not restricted to qualified
medical personnel, but transcend all categories of people who can prove they
acted with "due care and attention" while providing abortion. To that extent,
"good faith" in its present form, irrespective of its statutory interpretation in the
Penal Code, appears devoid of procedural content. Of course, non-physician
providers can equally claim to have acted diligently in their services to women
and girls accessing abortion. The rest will be left for evidence to determine
whether due diligence was actually exhibited, which determination may not
require the exhibition of medical professionalism. However, this unfortunate
situation could be avoided if "whoever" and "a person" are replaced with the
proper professional class contemplated by the drafters. In that case, "good
faith" would have more effective procedural underpinning since the observance
of "due care and attention" will be restricted to only the permitted class of
medical personnel. As such, the due diligence requirement will transform to a
creative discretionary tool that most trained medical personnel sympathetic to
the course of women can effectively rely upon in making their services available
to women seeking abortion.
On the other hand, a broader construction of "good faith" might reveal
some hidden legislative intentions. The traditional notion of good faith is to
require a physician abortion provider to obtain an independent medical opinion
of his colleagues before undertaking any abortion procedure. This traditional
meaning is given content and expression in the British Abortion Act of 196771
which exempts a physician abortion provider from criminal responsibility if two
other registered medical practitioners concur that the continuation of pregnancy
73. Pam Tok v. The State FCA/K/84/78 (unreported decision) (Federal Court of Appeal 1979)
(Nasir, Uwais & Ademola JJ.F.C.A).
74. Id.
75. See Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § I (Eng.).
2004] Opara
162 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:143
would endanger the life of the pregnant woman, or cause injury to the physical
or mental health of the pregnant woman, or cause substantial physical or mental
handicap to the unborn child.76 However, this peer-concurrence requirement
does not apply where the physician abortion provider is unilaterally of the
opinion that abortion is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent
grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman. 77  Another commonwealth jurisdiction that de jure requires peer
concurrence is Canada. Section 287 of the Criminal Code of Canada 8 is the
abortion law in Canada de jure. This section exempts a physician abortion
provider from criminal responsibility only where he, among other requirements,
obtains the approval of a three-person therapeutic abortion committee. The
procedural technicalities required in obtaining this committee approval was
vehemently disapproved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the celebrated
abortion-liberalizing case of R. v. Morgentaler.79 The Court was of the opinion
that the interest in the life or health of a pregnant woman, which Parliament held
out to take precedence over the interest in prohibiting abortions when the
continuation of the pregnancy of the woman would be likely to endanger her
life or health, was entrenched at least as a minimum when the right to life,
liberty and security of the person was enshrined in section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedom.8° It noted that
[a]n aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is
founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state ... The decision of a woman to terminate
her pregnancy falls within this class of protected decisions. It is a
decision which has profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman. Section 251 clearly violates
this right to liberty since it takes the decision away from the woman
and gives it to a committee.8'
Discussing the impact of this committee-approval requirement the Court argued
that the present legislative scheme in Canada not only subjects a pregnant
woman to considerable emotional stress as well as unnecessary physical risk but
that it leads to an even deeper flaw in asserting that a woman's capacity to
76. § 1(1).
77. § 1(4).
78. See CODE CRIMINAL ch. 46, § 287(1) (Can.).
79. See Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R. (14th) at 385-86.
80. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 7.
81. See Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R. (14th) at 388.
reproduce is not to be subject to her own control.82 The Morgentaler Case is the
defacto abortion law in Canada, having overruled the abortion provision of the
Criminal Code of Canada.
This extended construction of good faith operates as an access-limiting
factor. Apart from the delay associated with it, there is also the danger of
financial impediment on women accessing abortion. Accessing professional
medical opinion of the would-be committee may involve some cost to the
woman. In Nigeria, the overall cost of procuring abortion in most cases is borne
by the partners of the women accessing abortion. However, in some cases, the
women pay for the abortions themselves.83 This is unlike what occurs in some
advanced commonwealth jurisdictions where such costs are paid through
government health insurance plans. As such, the requirement of committee
approval will likely increase the overhead expenses of women and girls seeking
and accessing abortion. Therefore to require that a medical committee be
consulted before a pregnant woman or girl could access abortion indirectly
means denying the 'pregnancy victim' an opportunity of accessing abortion.
This creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality, between availability
and accessibility of abortion. In other words, a systemic inequality is triggered
by this extension in as much as poor women and girls will be unwittingly
excluded from accessing abortion. This obviously will run counter to inter-
nationally endorsed instruments of equal rights jurisprudence.84 As such, it is
thought that Nigerian society is not ripe for the extended traditional committee-
approval model of good faith.
The maintenance of the present statutory meaning appears to be a better
viable option. The failure of the traditional committee-approval model in
Canada, for instance, illustrates that the model only adds to the vulnerability of
women and girls. Hence this model will serve no public purpose in Nigeria.
Besides, it has the potential to defeat the overarching legislative aim of the
drafters in creating exception to outright prohibition of abortion when saving the
life of the woman becomes necessary. In addition, one of the reasons why
Nigerian women and girls patronize backstreet abortionists is because of the
secrecy associated with such clandestine services."
Invariably, an imposition of committee-approval requirement will amount
to more publicity which Nigerian women and girls are likely to shy away from.
This will have the negative effect of forcing them back to backstreet providers
at the detriment of their lives and health. Already abortion statistics have
82. Id.
83. See OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 14.
84. See e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman, opened
for signature Dec. 18, 1979, pt. 1, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16.
85. See Jinadu, supra note 15; see also OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 17.
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revealed an enormous increase in the death as well as complications in the
health of women accessing abortion through backstreet abortionists; there is
therefore no public purpose served by a further complication of the bleak
atmosphere. Accordingly, the extended traditional committee-approval meaning
of good faith should be resisted in Nigeria since our present medical history
does not give room to that. Such extensions will only muffle and gag the
legislative intention. As the present statutory definition in section 37 of the
Penal Code is clear, no attempt should be made to undertake any further voyage
of discovery; at best that would only amount to a fishing expedition which may
not properly address present realities in Nigerian society.
III. POSTSCRIPT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE MATERNAL AND CHILD
WELFARE, HEALTH SERVICES BILL OF 2004
Nigeria has always been less poised than other Commonwealth jurisdic-
tions to pursue a holistic reform of abortion law. This reluctance may be due
to the fact that in a secular and constitutional democracy like Nigeria, the
sensitive issue of abortion generates pluralistic and dichotomous views, which
are played out in the moral, religious, ethical, cultural, political, and legal
perceptions of society. Our experience under the present abortion laws thus far
has not been entirely satisfactory and Nigerian case law has had a checkered
history with respect to the issue of abortion. In 1981, as a result of the toll of
abortion on the life and health of Nigerian women and girls, the Nigerian
Society for Gynecology and Obstetrics sponsored a Termination of Pregnancy
Bill86 Unfortunately, the National Assembly did not approve that benign
gesture. Fortunately another attempt has been made in 2004 to stamp an era of
emancipation of Nigerian women and girls from untold abortion hardship.
Senator Stella Omu, of the House of Senate recently introduced the Maternal
and Child Welfare, Health Services (Procedure, etc) Bill of 2004 ("the Bill") to
the National Assembly.87 The Bill will concomitantly provide a legal frame-
work for overhauling an abortion regime that has marginalized, oppressed and
killed thousands of women and girls; it will revolutionize abortion law in
Nigeria.88 The Bill avoids most of the confounding technicalities of the present
laws. Undoubtedly, it is resounding success for those scholars who have advo-
cated for a liberal abortion climate in Nigeria.89 This section does not aim at
86. See Adi, supra note 1.
87. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004).
88. Id.
89. J.B. Akingba & S.A. Gbajumo, ProcuredAbortion: Counting the Cost, 7(2) J. NIG. MED. ASS'N
17 (1970). For a sequential ordering of compendious scholarly papers on Nigerian abortion medico-legal
regime, see J.B. AKINGBA, THE PROBLEM OF UNWANTED PREGNANCIES IN NIGERIA TODAY (1972); J.B.
Akingba, Abortion, Maternity, and Other Health Problems in Nigeria, 7(4) NIG. MED. L.J. 465 (1977); Adi,
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considering the Bill in its entirety, but rather closely engages only the provisions
that either expressly, implicitly or potentially impact on abortion. These
provisions are charted in line with their concomitant effect of amending or
reforming the abortion provisions of the Nigerian Criminal Code and Penal
Code.
Section 5(1)(c) of the Bill makes it an offence for
any person who through any act of negligence or omission or
dereliction of his lawful duties causes or influences, however
remotely, the miscarriage or termination of the pregnancy of any
woman; provided [that] no medical doctor or nurse/midwife shall be
criminally liable for termination of a pregnancy to save the life of a
woman.
90
The punishment for this offence is "a fine of 350,000 naira or imprisonment for
a period not exceeding five years or both such fine and imprisonment" (section
6(2)).9' These two sections are the only sections that impact on abortion apart
from the interpretative section 9, which defines the terms as used in the Bill.
These sections will potentially repeal sections 228, 229, 230, and 297 of the
Criminal Code and sections 232, 233, 234, and 235 of the Penal Code all of
which presently govern abortion in Nigeria. Of more particular interest to this
paper are the balances of the complex interplay of the abortion sections of the
Bill and sections 297of the Criminal Code and 232 and 235 of the Penal Code.
These provisions in the present laws make up the necessity test.
At first blush, it is clear that the Bill has succeeded in eliminating most of
the confounding clauses of the necessity test such as "performance of abortion
by any person (or whoever). 92 The Bill expressly permits "medical doctor or
nurse/midwife" to perform abortion.93 This categorization will assist in
containing backstreet abortion providers. One shortcoming of this welcome
categorization formula is the elimination of paramedic personnel. Common
sense knowledge will reveal that paramedics are as competent as nurses or
midwives, and in some cases may be more qualified. This observation is due
to the fact that some paramedics are qualified doctors from foreign jurisdictions
who have not yet been licensed by their jurisdiction of residence. Accordingly,
shutting them out from the list of permitted abortion providers may not be the
supra note 1; T.B.E. Ogiamien, A Legal Framework to Liberalize Abortion in Nigeria, 1988-91 NIG. CURRENT
L. REV. 107; Okagbue, supra note 48, at 197; OKONOFUA. supra note 8; Henshaw, supra note 4, at 159;
WOMEN'S HEALTH ANDACTION RESEARCH CENTRE, ABORTION LAW IN NIGERIA: THE WAY FORWARD (2000).
90. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004).
91. Id.
92. See C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297; PENAL C. §§ 232,235.
93. Supra, note 87, at § 5(l)(c).
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best option. In view of the somewhat high rate of maternal mortality and
morbidity resulting comparatively from Nigerian physician abortion providers,
nurses, midwives and paramedics,94 it is recommended that all classes of legal
abortion providers--medical practitioners, nurses, midwives, and hopefully
paramedics, be required to undergo some prescribed retraining. This goal can
easily be achieved through section 8 of the Bill, which grants the Federal
Minister of Health the "power and responsibility to oversee performance of the
instructions of this Act."95
The Bill has also succeeded in getting rid of "reasonable care and skill."96
This riddance is a welcome development in that the categorization of permitted
abortion providers invariably accomplishes this task. All registered medical
personnel are under statutory regulatory bodies. These bodies have rules of
professional responsibility that include duties of professional skill and
competence in service delivery to patients. The clause "surgical operation"97 is
not part of the Bill. This riddance is a good development because it leaves open
the suitable abortion procedure to the permitted abortion providers. A cursory
review of Nigerian abortion cases reveals that most abortions are achieved
through administration of drugs. 98 The Bill does not make any reference to
"good faith" which is one of the thresholds in the present law.99 This silence is
good because it avoids the potential danger of interpreting "good faith" broadly
to encompass medical peer-approval and consent, which will obviously pose a
lot of delays in abortion matters. °° The existing interpretation of this nebulous
concept has too much uncertainty and ambiguity for effective application within
the Nigerian criminal justice system.
More importantly the Bill reinforces the need to provide abortion "to save
the health and life of a woman" (emphasis added).' This is an extension of the
"preserving/saving the woman's life"' 2 threshold in the present laws and
appears to be the only footprint of the necessity test thresholds that is retained
by the Bill. The Bill, while recognizing the need to provide abortion to save the
94. See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 162.
95. See C. CRiM. ch. 21, § 297.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See State v. Njoku, E.C.S.L.R. 638 (1973); State v. Johnson Oke, 9 CC.H.C.J. 1305 (1975);
Commissioner of Police of Midwestern Region of Nigeria v Oruware, I All N.L.R. Par I 85 (1974); Modebe,
1 N.C.R. 367; R. v. Ejikeme, 10 W.A.C.A.. 252 (1944); Edgal, 4 W.A.C.A. 133 (1938); Ade-Ojo, 12 CC.H.C.J.
27; R. v. Idiong and Umo, 13 W.A.C.A. 30 (1950); and Tok, FCA/K/84/78.
99. See C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297.
100. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 1 (Eng.); see also C. CRiM. ch. 46, § 287(1).
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life of the woman, goes beyond strictly saving the life of the woman, which is
the only permitted ground under the present laws, to include saving the health
of the woman, °3 which includes therapeutic health. This is a great achievement.
It literally codifies the Bourne decision. Moreover "health" is defined in section
9(1) of the Bill to mean "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."'0 4 This is in accord
with World Health Organization's meaning of health. As a result of this subtle
but fundamentally important shift in the life-saving analysis, it is possible for
much to be achieved theoretically through this medium. The heuristic potentials
of this provision, which advocates can harness, include demanding for abortion
for any of the following grounds:
a) Where the continued pregnancy would endanger the life of the
pregnant woman or constitute a serious risk to her physical
health;
b) Where the continuation of the pregnancy would constitute a
serious threat to the pregnant woman's mental health and create
a danger of permanent damage to her mental health;
c) Where there was a serious risk that the child to be born would
suffer a physical or mental defect of such a nature as to be
irreparably handicapped;
d) Where the pregnancy was a result of unlawful sexual inter-
course including rape, incest or intercourse with a minor or
mentally defective female unable to appreciate the conse-
quences of intercourse or bear parental responsibilities.
With respect to the last option, theoretically the expanded clause could be
axiomatic to advocacy in abortion for victims of rape and incest, however some
practical and technical difficulties may defeat this benign and rationally
connected objective. There is the need to reduce the trauma and emotional
distress of victims of rape and incest by broadening the grounds for legal
abortion to expressly include rape or incest, contrary to observations canvassed
elsewhere. 5  In the English case of R. v. Bourne'0 6 mentioned earlier, an
obstetric surgeon performed an abortion on a 15-year old girl who was raped on
the grounds that she would otherwise have become a mental wreck. This case
103. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004), § 5(1)(c).
104. Id.
105. See Okagbue, supra note 48, at 203 (observing that "[rlape and incest sometimes serve as
indications for abortion in various jurisdictions. As a separate indication, this ground may be somewhat
superfluous because it may be more properly subsumed under the medical indication of risk of injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.").
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is very popular in most commonwealth jurisdictions mainly because of its
expansive defense of therapeutic abortion far beyond the necessity test to
encompass the protection of the physical or mental health of the woman.'07 An
express inclusion of rape or incest as permissible grounds for abortion will
create a more practical climate for victims to have recourse to abortion facilities
without much difficulty, and will also place the burden on the state to prove the
contrary. Otherwise, using the health definition of the Bill may not easily
achieve this objective for victims of rape or incest, as the burden of proving rape
or incest may be placed on them. The high cost of accessing expert evidence,
coupled with the general bureaucracy that surrounds most Nigerian facilities
may severely inhibit this worthwhile legislative intention." 8 It is disheartening
to prevent victims of rape from accessing abortion considering the general
circumstances surrounding their dilemma. Arguably, government is to blame
for the porous security in the country, which intensifies the vulnerability of
women. Failure to treat rape as an indication for abortion translates into
government insensitivity of national realities. This joining of the theoretical
concerns of rape and incest with their practical impact on abortion should be a
central concern of policy makers and advocates.
Overall, although the Bill may not achieve a veritable haven for those
seeking abortion, since abortions by physician providers have had some
consequences on women's reproductive health as well, the Bill's abandonment
of the confounding thresholds characterizing the present laws appears to have
107. Id.
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the potential of downplaying or reducing the consequences emanating from
physician providers. Medical practitioners will be more willing to provide
abortion services based on their subjective interpretation of "saving the health
and life of a woman."' 0 9 Abortion will be performed in a more secure
atmosphere; secrecy is bound to dwindle as a result of the Bill's openness. The
close supervision of the law will encourage users to pursue their claims in the
event of medical negligence, and will also have the effect of improving the
efficiency of physician providers. On the whole, the Bill will result in a win-
win situation. Another important accomplishment of the Bill will be the
creation of a uniform abortion law in Nigeria. By concomitantly repealing the
abortion provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes, the Bill would achieve an
incremental harmonization of the somewhat divergent Codes.
IV. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
While the objective of the necessity test is to provide an escape route from
a fully prohibitive abortion regime, some of the means chosen to advance that
objective appear unsuitable. Some of the thresholds in their present state neither
present a veritable haven nor viable refuge for women and girls whose lives are
jeopardized by the continuation of pregnancy. The words "whoever" and "a
person" should be expunged from the exception clauses; in their place, words
capable of specifically identifying the contemplated class of persons permitted
to perform abortion should be substituted. This categorization is in order to
exclude backstreet abortionists. On the other hand, the present statutory
meaning of "good faith" should be maintained since an extended meaning will
trigger technicalities and procedural dangers.
It is advisable that qualified nurses, midwives, and paramedics be per-
mitted to perform abortions at early stages of pregnancy. This is for practical
accessibility purposes in view of the dearth of medical practitioners in most
Nigerian rural communities, coupled with the high cost of accessing medical
practitioners. This may bridge the gap between availability and accessibility.
In Nigeria, maternities are recognized birthing centers that are owned and run
by nurses and midwives. So far, the Nigerian public appears satisfied with their
services. Permitting them to diversify into abortion at early pregnancy will
presumably be acceptable too. However, they should be made to consult and
work with a medical practitioner in case of potential emergencies. The statutory
means of achieving life-saving abortion must be expanded to include purely
medical procedures, like administration of drugs. Unfortunately, the present
"surgical operation" channel is too restrictive and appears to permit only
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medical practitioners to perform abortion. This narrow channel should be
abandoned.
It is recommended that the National Assembly set up a law reform
commission with the aim of carrying out a program of research into abortion.
The commission should be given the task of conducting opinion polls aimed at
getting the perceptions of society towards abortion. The public opinion that
existed as at the time the laws were enacted might have shifted substantially.
As the current opinion of members of society help to determine what the law
should be, it is not jurisprudentially justifiable for laws enacted many decades
ago to remain in force without revision. It does not help our legal system to
have a jurisprudence that is static and rigid, undermining innovations, techno-
logy and modem realities. It does not improve our legal system to have a
jurisprudence that holds tenaciously to old time tradition and belief even when
it has dawned on us that the world is changing for the better. Accordingly, it
has been argued that:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind limitation of the past."'°
The text of the British Offences against the Person Act of 1861, which
substantially constitutes the abortion laws in Nigeria, is more than two centuries
old.i"' It therefore makes no practical sense nor serves any public purpose that
an antiquarian law should continue to exist without regard to social dynamics
and prevailing realities. There is no justifiable reason for Nigeria to continue
its tenacious loyalty to the outdated Act.
It is further recommended that the Nigerian Judiciary should bring
creativity to bear in abortion matters. As this paper has revealed, it was the
creative interpretation of Justice Macnaghten in R. v. Bourne that motivated the
British Parliament to amend and clarify the Offences Against the Person Act of
1861.12 This is embodied in the present Abortion Act of 1967. In a similar
vein, the Canadian example is equally illustrative ofjudicial creativity. It is the
creative judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morgentaler that is
presently the defacto abortion law in Canada. That case overruled the statutory
abortion provisions in Canada. Moreover, a look at three U.S. Supreme Court
110. Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 61 (1897).
111. See Bourne 1 K.B. at 690 (in which Macnaghten J. observed that: "The defendant is charged
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cases: Griswold (1965); Eisenstadt (1972) and Roe v. Wade (1973) reveals that
although the U.S. Congress did not at anytime in between these cases change the
law, the Court brought about a fundamental change which virtually heightened
the jurisprudence of individual autonomy and to some reasonable extent
equality rights jurisprudence in the American legal system. Nothing prevents
Nigerian courts from flexing similar judicial creative muscles.
This analysis has shown that induced abortion is prevalent in Nigeria
notwithstanding the restrictions of the law. It would therefore be necessary for
Nigerian government to face present realities by developing policies that aim to
address this critical issue in order to reduce the high rate of maternal mortality
and morbidity arising from this practice. The present abortion laws, from all
indications, appear to have failed in that the aim of unduly restricting abortion
is to prevent women and girls from seeking and accessing abortion, notwith-
standing, the rate of abortion still continues to escalate daily. Invariably, the
end that the law was designed to achieve has been defeated. Justice Holmes
noted, "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it
contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it sub-
serves.... ,13
Nigerian women and girls do not seem to be deterred by the legal
consequences of the "crime" of abortion. The aftermath, however, is that most
of the abortions are carried out in medically unsafe environments, thereby
endangering the lives of users. The law is responsible for this loss of life. It
therefore behooves the Nigerian National Assembly to amend the law in order
to make it conform to modern reality. A viable alternative mechanism would
be the adoption of a somewhat liberal approach. This anticipated liberal
formula can easily be achieved through the enactment of the abortion provisions
(section 5) of the Maternal and Child Welfare, Health Services Act of 2004,
with thorough amendments to some other parts of the Bill. It is hoped that this
second opportunity will not be wasted again.
113. Holmes, supra note 111.
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